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Abstract 
This research investigates stateless income tax strategies pursued by firms that are 
publicly listed in the United States. Stateless income strategies are employed by 
multinational corporations, particularly American firms, through a Double Irish Dutch 
Sandwich (DIDS) structure to reduce tax liabilities. By examining 700 listed U.S. firms 
over the period from 2004 to 2013, this research found that larger firms with higher 
levels of foreign income are more likely to adopt a DIDS structure. Additionally, 
multinational corporations employing a DIDS structure are associated with a lower 
effective tax rate compared to their domestic counterparties. Regression analysis 
demonstrates that a firm’s effective tax rates are associated with its size, leverage, 
capital structure, capital mix and foreign income. We propose that development and 
investment in intellectual property is an important component in generating stateless 
income, and firms engaged in stateless income strategies hold large amounts of cash 
outside of the U.S. 
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Introduction 
Corporate taxation revenue is one of the most important sources of income for the 
government. However, multinational corporations avoid tax liability by operating in 
different countries and jurisdictions, using approaches such as stripping earnings and 
shifting profits from high tax rate countries to low tax rate countries (OECD 2013). Tax 
avoidance is not a new issue in global business (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; Desai 
and Dharmapala 2006). Hamilton et al. (2001) contend that multinational corporations 
have arrangements for tax avoidance included in their overall commercial 
arrangements. Kleinbard (2011) describes tax free income arising from the 
sophisticated tax planning structure embedded in multinational business activities as 
stateless income. Previous studies show large multinational corporations take 
advantage of gaps in taxation rules between countries to reduce their tax liabilities 
(Braithwaite 2005). OECD (2013) warns that the overall effect of a stateless income 
strategy is to erode the corporate tax base of many countries. 
 
The research investigated how multinational corporations avoid corporate taxation 
through stateless income strategies; it inspected whether stateless income strategies 
are only accessible by companies that have been the focus of the media or if it is widely 
applicable to all large multinational corporations; and examined anecdotal claims that 
stateless income strategies are popular with large American firms. The data sample 
included the top 700 U.S. listed companies in terms of market value from 2004 to 2013. 
This broad period provided more rigorous empirical evidence on the prevalence of 
stateless income, and the relationship between stateless income strategies and the 
characteristics of the firm than single company case studies (Drucker 2010; 
Kocieniewski 2011). The research involved exploring whether multinational 
corporations are paying a lower tax rate than domestic companies, whether the lower 
effective tax rate is due to stateless income, and the characteristics of these firms. 
Specifically, it examined the relationship between the level of effective corporate tax 
rates and a firm’s size, capital structure, capital mix, performance and other 
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characteristics. 
 
Empirical findings suggest that firms with a higher proportion of intellectual properties 
are more likely to adopt a Double Irish Dutch Sandwich (DIDS) structure, though the 
interaction of intellectual properties and a DIDS structure are different across 
industries. The empirical results also show that firms adopting a DIDS structure tend 
to have lower effective tax rates (ETRs) compared to firms that do not engage in a DIDS 
structure. Additionally, the adoption of a DIDS structure has a significant impact on a 
firms’ operating strategies. For example, firms with a DIDS structure tend to hold a 
large amount of cash outside U.S. territory and pay less dividends. 
 
The research contributes to current knowledge in several aspects. Firstly, it provides a 
comprehensive review and analysis on the prevalence and determinants of stateless 
income strategies. Secondly, it is the first study that extends the current body of 
knowledge relating to ETRs by empirically exploring the relationship between stateless 
income strategies and firm effective tax rate. Most notably, a new variable is developed 
that enables an analysis of the impact of stateless income strategies on a firm’s 
effective tax rate. Further contributions to the literature on stateless income include 
an exploration of the interaction between development and investment in intellectual 
property and cash balances on stateless income strategies and DIDS structures, and 
the effect on ETRs. 
 
This thesis is organized as follows: Section 1 contains background discussion on 
stateless income. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the research design and methodology. Section 4 describes data and 
empirical findings. Finally, a summary and conclusions are presented in section 5. 
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1. Stateless income 
1.1 What is stateless income? 
Stateless income is described as income derived by a multinational group from 
business activities in a country other than the domicile of the group’s ultimate parent 
company. It is subject to tax only in a jurisdiction that is not the location of the 
customers or the factors of production through which the income was derived, and is 
not the domicile of the group’s parent company (Kleinbard 2011). 
 
1.2 The practice of stateless income 
Multinational corporations generate stateless income through their aggressive 
approach to tax planning. The ultimate goal of aggressive tax planning is to minimise 
the overall expense of taxation to the group (Gresik 2001). Traditionally, for a domestic 
company facing a fixed statutory corporate tax rate, higher profit will always lead to a 
higher corporate tax expense. Firms need to deliberately reduce taxable income to 
reduce taxation expense. The multinational status of a firm provides managers with 
the opportunity to reduce the overall tax expense as corporate taxation rates vary 
across countries. There are various ways multinational corporations can generate 
stateless income. Four popular tax planning strategies are summarized in the following 
sections. 
 
1.2.1 Profit Shifting 
Profit shifting involves a corporation shifting profits generated in a high tax region to a 
low tax region for the purposes of reducing overall income tax. Profit shifting could be 
generated through an intragroup debt financing structure whereby the multinational 
company will create a debt financing arrangement between two arms of the business 
group where one arm is a tax resident in a high tax region, and the other is a tax 
resident in a relatively lower tax region. Thus, tax-deductible expenses can be acquired 
by the subsidiary in the high tax nation and reduce overall tax liability. However, this is 
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not consistent with the notion that members of a multinational corporation operate 
as independent entities rather than inseparable parts of a single unified business. 
Multinational corporations unify their decisions across countries to act in the best 
interest of the whole group rather than individual entities. Several studies document 
that internal debt activities have significant effects on the taxation liability of 
multinational firms (Grubert and Mutti 1991; Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Buettner and 
Wamser 2013). In short, this profit shifting mechanism would not change the overall 
income of multinational corporations as a group, but it can effectively lower the total 
income tax expense paid to tax authorities. 
 
1.2.2 Cost-Sharing Arrangements 
A cost-sharing arrangement is defined as “an arrangement under which controlled 
participants agree to share the costs and risk of developing intangible property in 
accordance with their reasonably anticipated shares of benefits from the intangibles” 
(Code of Federal Regulations 2014). This strategy is widely adopted by multinational 
corporations to split the usage rights and development costs of their intangible 
property across different tax regions. A common approach is to allocate usage rights 
to low tax regions, and development costs to high tax regions. Multinational 
corporations rely on intangible property to enable cost-sharing arrangements and 
reduce tax liabilities. Intangible property becomes a legal mechanism for multinational 
corporations to shift profits to low tax countries. Ting (2014) argues that the cost-
sharing arrangements used by multinational corporations, such as Apple, cannot be 
legitimately justified because they shift a disproportionate amount of profit to 
subsidiaries in low tax regions. 
 
1.2.3 Transfer Pricing 
Another strategy to generate stateless income is transfer pricing (Altshuler and 
Grubert 2003). Multinational corporations adopt aggressive intragroup transactions 
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that favour subsidiaries in low tax countries and hence shift profit from high tax 
countries to low tax countries, eventually reducing the total tax expenses of the 
consolidated business group. However, intragroup transactions need to follow the 
arm’s length principle required by tax authorities, which posits that the price charged 
by related parties should be similar to the price based on independent market 
transactions (OECD 2010). Kleinbard (2011) states that the arm’s length principle does 
not work well when a multinational corporation licenses high-value internally created 
intangibles that have no direct measurable market value to its subsidiaries. This 
argument is supported by a case study on Starbucks U.K., a multinational company 
that pays a substantial royalty fee (or franchise fee) to its Netherlands subsidiary, which 
results in an overall income loss being reported to the U.K. taxation authorities 
(Kleinbard 2013). The use of intragroup transactions between subsidiaries has a 
significant impact on the taxable income reported to local taxation authorities and the 
tax paid. Hence, a transfer pricing strategy allows multinational corporations to lower 
the total corporate tax rate for the consolidated business group. 
 
1.2.4 The Geographical Location of Subsidiaries 
The fourth strategy to generate stateless income is through regulatory arbitrage, which 
involves multinational corporations exploiting differences in taxation laws between 
countries. For example, a tax-deductible item in one country might not receive similar 
tax treatment in other jurisdictions. Corporations can effectively generate income that 
is not taxed by any of the tax authorities due to inconsistencies between the different 
legal systems. This approach requires expanding the business in low tax regions. A 
nation’s corporate tax rate is one of the most important factors for multinational 
corporations when they make decisions about investments. Multinational 
corporations can allocate their highly profitable projects from high tax regions to low 
tax regions by expanding business across different jurisdictions with different tax rates 
and legal definitions, which allows them to minimise tax and maximize profits. 
Multinational corporations can have a lower effective tax rate compared to their 
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domestic counterparts by engaging in discretionary corporate expansion and 
generating stateless income. 
 
1.3 The Double Irish Dutch Sandwich 
The DIDS has become one of the most popular tax planning strategies for multinational 
corporations incorporated in the U.S. Typical tax planning strategies related to the DIDS 
include profit shifting, transfer pricing, cost-sharing arrangements and exploiting 
conflicting tax codes. 
 
Figure 1 describes a typical DIDS structure. First, a multinational corporation 
establishes an Irish subsidiary (‘Irish Holdings’). The parent company sells the right to 
use an intangible asset outside the home country for a fraction of the development 
cost. The parent company still has the rights to use the intangible asset in the U.S., but 
Irish Holdings takes over the rights to use it in business outside the U.S. As a result, the 
distribution of tax deductibility does not match the distribution of the profit. Therefore, 
multinational corporations deliberately allocate more before-tax profit into low 
corporate tax regions. 
 
Second, Irish Holdings establishes a subsidiary in Bermuda for tax purposes, and claims 
the Bermuda subsidiary as the ‘effective centre of management’ for the Irish Holdings 
Group. Consequently, Irish Holdings then becomes a dual resident company, whereby 
it incorporates in Ireland while simultaneously being a tax resident of Bermuda. 
Therefore, for U.S. taxation purposes, Irish Holdings is an Irish corporation and tax 
resident. For Irish taxation purpose, Irish Holdings is a tax resident of Bermuda. At the 
same time, Irish Holdings establishes a subsidiary in Netherlands (‘Netherlands 
Holdings’). Netherlands Holdings has the rights to use the intangible asset controlled 
by the Irish Holdings. Third, Netherlands Holdings again establishes another subsidiary 
in Ireland (‘Irish Limited’), and sub-licenses Irish Limited to use the intangible asset, 
operate business and collect revenues from customers outside the U.S. 
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Eventually, fees paid to Irish Limited in the source countries are tax deductible. Irish 
withholding tax is applied if a royalty fee is paid directly from an Irish company to its 
Bermuda subsidiary. However, Irish withholding tax can be waived if the royalty fee is 
paid to the Netherlands subsidiary as both are company residents in the EU. Therefore, 
Irish Limited transfers its income to the Netherland subsidiary as a royalty fee, and 
then the Netherlands subsidiary transfers funds as a royalty fee again to the Bermuda 
subsidiary (the reason being that Netherlands does not apply withholding tax on 
royalty fees paid to another company outside the EU). As a result, Irish Limited does 
not have to pay any Irish corporate tax as it has been fully deducted. As the 
Netherlands subsidiary pays its profits to the Bermuda subsidiary of the Irish Holdings 
through a ‘royalty fee’, it does not retain any profit and hence avoids taxation liability 
on this amount to Dutch authorities. As the corporate tax rate in Bermuda is zero, all 
income moved to Irish Holdings avoids corporate tax. 
 
The Netherlands subsidiary and Irish Limited are not considered as legal entities for 
U.S. taxation purposes by virtue of electing to use ‘check the box’ filings. Hence, no 
direct U.S. taxation law can be applied to these two subsidiaries. However, under Irish 
taxation law, Irish Holdings is also considered a Bermuda company; therefore, no tax 
is applied. Moreover, firms involved in stateless income strategies would face an 
earnings lock-out effect (Kleinbard, 2011). This means that the firm must retain most 
of its earnings overseas (outside the U.S.) because U.S. corporate taxes will be applied 
if the directors decide to send the foreign income back to the U.S. Hence, a popular 
choice for multinational corporations is to retain a large amount of profits in low tax 
countries, which are kept in relatively low-yielding liquid investments or reinvested in 
foreign subsidiaries instead of sent back to the U.S. firm. 
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Figure 1 Double Irish Dutch Sandwich Structure 
 
 
U.S. Parent Company 
Irish Holdings 
Irish / Bermuda 
 
Netherlands 
subsidiary 
License of intangible asset $ $ Royalty fee 
Irish Limited 
Sub-license of intangible asset $ $ Royalty fee 
Irish Holding is a dual resident company. 
Incorporate in Ireland (U.S. law), but tax 
resident in Bermuda (Irish law).  
Bermuda does not have corporate tax. 
Netherlands subsidiary do not pay corporate 
tax as all profit has been deducted and paid 
to Irish Holdings (Bermuda). 
Irish Limited do not pay corporate tax as all 
profit has been deducted and paid to 
Netherlands subsidiary.  
Africa Customers Europe Customers Asia Customers 
$ $ Fees 
$ $ Fees 
$ $ Fees 
$$ “Buy-in” 
payment 
One-off payment 
The usage right of 
intangible asset outside 
U.S. 
Cost sharing arrangement: Irish 
Holdings is now bear future 
development costs in proportion 
to its profit over the worldwide 
market. 
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2. Literature review and development of hypotheses 
Tax planning strategies employed by multinational corporations are well documented 
in the literature (Slemrod 2001; Creedy and Gemmell 2011; Taylor and Richardson, 
2012). Common tax planning strategies include profit shifting, cost-sharing and 
transfer pricing to gain tax benefits for the entire business group (Rego 2003; Dyreng 
and Lindsey 2009; Faulkender and Petersen 2012). Furthermore, sophisticated and 
aggressive tax planning strategies have been employed by multinational corporations 
to generate tax free income, which is normally called stateless income (Kleinbard 2011). 
Multinational corporations use such strategies to effectively manage their taxable 
income and expenses across all subsidiaries located in various places, and reduce the 
tax liabilities for the whole consolidated business groups. 
 
As stateless income tax strategies and a DIDS structure are purely lawful in the 
jurisdictions involved, they could be considered as a special investment project for 
minimising tax liabilities. The theoretical relationship between investment and taxes 
has been well documented in the literature. For example, the neoclassical theory of 
investment proposed by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) argues that the cost of investment 
is a function of the required return on investment with an adjustment of corporate 
taxes. This argument has been further supported by the work of Hasset and Hubbard 
(2002) who review the Hall and Jorgenson (1967) model as the effect of tax planning 
strategy on investment. Recently, Anderson (2012) uses this model to examine the 
relationship between taxes and the user cost of capital, and finds that a higher 
corporate tax rate has the effect of increasing the after-tax rate of return for investors 
and, thus, increases the user cost of capital. 
 
Recently Tobin’s q has become a popular approach to empirically investigate the 
practical application of the neoclassical theory of investment (McNichols and 
Steubben 2008; Bushman et al. 2008; Biddle et al. 2009). Additionally, Tobin’s q is a 
better measure in terms of reflecting the market sentiment (Richard et al. 2009). The 
 11 
 
rational investor would choose to adopt the project as long as the marginal revenue 
exceeds the marginal cost or the q value exceeds 1 (Bolton et al., 2011). Thus, as long 
as the cost of developing and establishing a DIDS structure is less than the amount of 
tax that could be saved, multinational firms would choose to adopt it as a major tax 
planning strategy. 
 
Empirical studies focusing on the relationship between investment decisions and tax 
liabilities have found that investment in intangible assets has a significant negative 
impact on the tax rate because expenditure relating to research and development is 
tax deductible, therefore, leading to a lower tax rate (Gupta et al. 2006; Chen and 
Gupta 2009). Additionally, the destination of the investment also considerably 
influences a firm’s decision. Maydew (2001) argues that firms attempt to invest in 
countries with lower tax rates. Additionally, Shackelford et al. (2010) finds that U.S. 
firms are more likely to invest overseas due to the special tax treatment which allows 
them to retain their foreign profits until these profits are repatriated to the U.S. 
However, empirical evidence that addresses the causes and consequences of ‘stateless 
income’ tax strategies is limited. 
 
Numerous attempts have been made to explain ETRs and demonstrate their empirical 
relationship to the characteristics of firms. Popular choices for the independent 
variables are the size of the firm, leverage, and inventory level, level of intangible 
assets, profitability, and industry. However, empirical findings are mixed. They show 
that ETRs are associated with size of the firm (Porcano 1986; Tran 1997; Grubert and 
Mutti 2007; Dyreng et al. 2008), capital structure (Gupta and Newberry, 1997), and 
intangible assets (Huizinga et al., 2008). However, very few studies investigate how 
ETRs are related to large multinational firms (Taylor and Richardson, 2012; and Markle 
and Shackelford, 2012). In addition, investigation into the effect of ‘stateless income’ 
tax strategies on firms’ ETRs is lacking in the current literature. As discussed before, 
‘stateless income’ tax strategies are an advanced tax planning structure used to 
aggressively reduce a firm’s tax liabilities. The following section provides a detailed 
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discussion on the existing literature and develops hypotheses. 
 
2.1 DIDS – The geographic location of subsidiaries, foreign income and 
repatriation 
A firm engaging in stateless income tax strategies must necessarily have a subsidiary 
operating in a tax jurisdiction that offers a lower corporate tax rate than that of the 
U.S. By operating across countries and jurisdictions with different tax rates, 
multinational corporations can shift income within the group to lower tax rate regimes 
and minimise their overall tax liabilities (Maydew 2001; Beuselinck et al. 2005). 
Kleinbard (2011) argues that stateless income is a more aggressive tax planning 
strategies employed by multinational corporations. It could be generated through a 
DIDS structure, in which, established subsidiaries located in Ireland and the 
Netherlands is a necessary requirement to generate ‘stateless income’. Firms having 
Irish and Dutch subsidiaries would be more likely to adopt a DIDS structure and 
generate stateless income, leading to lower ETRs. 
 
Taylor and Richardson (2012) find a significant negative relationship between the ETRs 
and the international operations of a firm. Establishing a foreign subsidiary is a key 
component of tax planning strategy, as multinational corporations can use intragroup 
transactions to increase profit in low tax countries and hence reduce total tax expenses. 
However, a firm’s ability to reduce tax liabilities is also affected by the proportion of 
foreign income generated. The more foreign revenue reported in the low tax rate 
countries, the lower the ETRs. Empirical evidence shows that firms with a larger 
portion of foreign income enjoy lower ETRs and have more opportunities to engage in 
tax avoidance activities compared to their domestic competitors (Rego 2003; Dyreng 
et al. 2008; Richardson and Lanis 2007). This situation can be attributed to U.S. tax 
regulations; a worldwide tax system that requires corporations to report on all foreign 
income. However, foreign revenue is not subject to US income tax if it has not been 
repatriated back to the parent companies in the U.S. because ABP23 (Accounting for 
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Income Taxes – Special Areas) allows for an exception where a corporation need not 
record deferred tax liabilities if the foreign revenue is permanently reinvested in the 
foreign jurisdiction until it decides to repatriate the revenue. In this case, the income 
tax expense on this foreign revenue would be only at the tax rate of the local 
jurisdiction instead of the U.S. statutory tax rate. 
 
The repatriation decision is aligned with the lock-out effect, which involves 
multinational corporations that report massive foreign income from low tax 
jurisdictions retaining these profits outside the U.S. and experiencing difficulty sending 
them back to parent companies. Foley et al. (2007) presents evidence that large cash 
balances are related to repatriation taxes. Following from the above discussion, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between ETRs and DIDS. 
H2: There is a negative relationship between ETRs and firm foreign income. 
H3: There is a negative relationship between ETRs and cash and cash equivalent. 
 
2.2 Size of a firm 
Many studies have focused on the effect of a firm’s size on corporate ETRs. 
Zimmerman (1983) finds a positive relationship between corporate size and ETRs and 
uses a “political cost hypothesis” to explain this phenomenon. This hypothesis 
suggests that large and high profitability firms attract more media and consumer 
attention, which can result in tougher regulatory scrutiny and minimise opportunities 
for tax avoidance (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Rego (2003) also finds a significant 
positive relationship between ETRs and size using logarithm net sales as an alternative 
indicator of size. In contrast, Porcano (1986) finds that the firm’s size and its ETRs are 
negatively related, which could also be explained by a political power hypothesis that 
that larger firms have more power to influence the setting of regulations in their favour. 
The study of Australian listed firms by Tran (1997) finds that larger firms have lower 
ETRs than smaller firms. 
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Gupta and Newberry (1997) used two samples of firms to analyse the relationship 
between their size and ETRs, and generated contradictory results. Therefore, they 
argue that effect of a firm’s size is subject to the samples selected. Moreover, Jacob 
(1996) and Mills (1998) find an insignificant relationship between ETRs and a firm’s 
size. Combining the political power and political cost hypothesis, Davidson and Heaney 
(2012) observe a non-linear relationship between a firm’s size and its ETRs, arguing 
that both hypotheses can be better explained by a quadratic relationship. Although 
the empirical evidence is mixed, recent studies are more likely to observe a negative 
relationship between the size of a firm and ETRs (Richardson and Lanis 2007; Markle 
and Shackelford 2012; Taylor and Richardson 2012), which likely reflects the recent 
phenomenon of adopting a DIDS strategy. Following from the above discussion, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H4: There is a negative relationship between ETRs and firm size. 
 
2.3 Capital structure & capital-intensive 
Capital structure is another important factor affecting a firm’s ETRs. Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) discover that tax-deductible interest creates incentives for firms to use 
debt financing. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest that the relationship between the 
capital structure of a firm and ETRs could be explained by the substitution hypothesis, 
which suggests that firms are less leveraged if they are associated with more non-debt 
tax shields. As debt financing generates a tax-deductible interest expense, firms that 
rely more on equity financing do not get such tax credit for dividend payouts. This 
hypothesis is supported by Stickney and McGee (1982), who found that firms bearing 
higher leverage tend to have lower ETRs. Several other studies reach similar 
conclusions (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003; Richardson and Lanis 2007). Debt 
financing decisions may also be influenced by the extent of a firm’s globalization and 
its ability to generate stateless income. As discussed, multinational firms use an 
intragroup debt financing structure to shift profits from high to low tax rate regimes to 
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reduce their corporate taxes (Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Buettner and Wamser 2013). 
Therefore, multinational firms bearing higher leverage have a higher potential and 
ability to generate such advantage. 
 
Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Stickney and McGee (1982) also point out that firms 
with a high proportion of fixed assets tend to have lower ETRs than firms holding large 
amounts of inventory. The reason is that there are tax incentives on holding fixed 
assets as taxation laws often allow for the application of different depreciation 
methods to fixed assets as compared to inventory. For example, firms can write off the 
value of depreciable assets in a shorter period than their actual economic lives and 
thereby receive favourable tax treatment (Richardson and Lanis 2007). Therefore, 
capital-intensive firms would face lower ETRs. This argument is supported by 
Zimmerman (1983) as he found that firms in the manufacturing sector are associated 
with lower ETRs relative to firms in wholesale and retail sectors, and that ETRs do vary 
between industries due to the characteristics of capital intensity. However, these 
studies do not identify the effect of tangible and intangible assets on a firm’s effective 
tax rate. 
 
More recent studies investigate the relationship between ETRs and investment in 
intangible assets (Hassett and Newmark 2008). Huizinga et al. (2008) and Grubert and 
Mutti (2007) suggest that firms with a large proportion of intangible assets are 
associated with lower ETRs. Concrete instances are well documented in the media; 
tech companies are criticized for avoiding taxes by relying heavily on their intellectual 
property to generate service and sales (Drucker 2010; Kocieniewski 2011). Another 
factor related to the development and investment of intangible assets is a firm’s 
research and development expenditure (Berger, 1993). As firms engage in research 
and development to build and develop their intellectual intangible property, 
expenditure in research and development is negatively related to ETRs (Gupta and 
Newberry, 1997; Gupta et al., 2006; Chen and Gupta, 2009). Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
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H5: There is a negative relationship between ETRs and firm leverage. 
H6: There is a negative relationship between ETRs and firm capital intensity. 
H7: There is a positive relationship between ETRs and firm inventory intensity. 
H8: There is a negative relationship between ETRs and firm R&D intensity. 
 
2.4 Performance of a firm 
To examine the determinants of corporate tax rate, previous studies also consider the 
effect of firm specific variables on ETRs. For instance, the relationship between ETRs 
and firm performance has been considered in several studies (Gupta and Newberry, 
1997; Derashid and Zhang, 2003; Richardson and Lanis, 2007). Empirical findings show 
that firm performance is positively related to ETRs, supporting the notion that higher 
profit lead to a higher corporate tax expense. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H9: There is a positive relationship between ETRs and a firm’s performance. 
 
2.5 Dividend decisions 
Firms engaging in stateless income strategies are reluctant to send profits back to U.S. 
due to tax concerns. Although a significant amount of profit is recognized in their 
consolidated statements, multinational corporations may have to retain and reinvest 
those profits in their foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, firms engaging in a stateless 
income strategy might not be able to pay good dividends to shareholders of parent 
companies even when they have a large amount of profit retained in foreign 
subsidiaries. Thus, stateless income practices may have an impact on a firm’s ability to 
raise the cash for a dividend payout to shareholders of parent companies. Following 
from this, it is hypothesized that: 
H10: There is a negative relationship between firm dividend yield and DIDS. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample and data 
The data for this study was sourced from the Bureau van Dijk Orbis database. The initial 
sample included the top 700 listed companies in the U.S. in terms of market 
capitalization because stateless income tax strategies can only be exploited by large 
multinational corporations due to their global operations (Kleinbard, 2011). The 
sample spans from 2004 to 2013, a period which represents the most relevant and 
recent years that were available on the database. The final sample set was constructed 
by excluding firms with missing data on the explanatory variables (the firm contains 
‘n.a.’ in any of the observations); and those with outlier ETRs (that is, firms with ETRs 
either less than 0 or greater than 0.45). Literature shows that an analysis of ETRs would 
be distorted if a firm reports negative incomes and abnormal ETRs greater than the 
statutory corporate tax rate (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003; Richardson and 
Lanis 2007). The reason is that unusual tax related events can cause model estimation 
problems (Richardson and Lanis 2007; Markel and Shackelford 2012). The final data 
set consisted of 392 firms and 2837 firm-year observations. 
 
The Orbis database does not report when the foreign subsidiary was established. 
Therefore, we followed the approach of Markle and Shackelford (2012) who found 
that the estimated coefficient of subsidiary measure for each year is similar regardless 
of the sample period. Another potential limitation of using Orbis is that firms may 
report total North America revenue as a whole in the geographic segment. As a result, 
we treated the total North America revenue as the total revenue from the U.S with 
the assumption that the difference between U.S. and North American revenue is 
insignificant. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on the relationships between DIDS structure, industry and year 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the relationships between DIDS structure, 
industry and year. The results show that firm-year observations are fairly distributed 
over the period from 2004 to 2013 with fewer observations in 2004 (6.3%) and more 
Table 1 Summary Descriptive Statics for Different Years and Industries 
Panel A: Summary for year and industry
Non-DIDS DIDS Total Percentage
y2004 108 71 179 6.3%
y2005 152 106 258 9.1%
y2006 165 109 274 9.7%
y2007 188 120 308 10.9%
y2008 186 109 295 10.4%
y2009 183 107 290 10.2%
y2010 177 117 294 10.4%
y2011 198 123 321 11.3%
y2012 185 113 298 10.5%
y2013 203 117 320 11.3%
Total 1745 1092 2837 100.0%
Panel B: Summary of industry
Non-DIDS DIDS Total Percentage
indA 18 0 18 0.6%
indB 41 13 54 1.9%
indC 829 769 1,598 56.3%
indD 308 0 308 10.9%
indE 0 3 3 0.1%
indF 33 0 33 1.2%
indG 294 123 417 14.7%
indH 53 0 53 1.9%
indI 51 24 75 2.6%
indJ 41 114 155 5.5%
indK 9 0 9 0.3%
indM 13 42 55 1.9%
indN 10 4 14 0.5%
indQ 36 0 36 1.3%
indS 9 0 9 0.3%
Total 1745 1092 2837 100%
Industry code are follow NACE. industry code where Industry A:  Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Industry B:
Mining and quarrying; Industry C: Manufacturing; Industry D: Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply;
Industry E: Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; Industry F: Construction;
Industry G:  Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; Industry H: Transportation
and storage; Industry I:  Accommodation and food service activities; Industry J:  Information and
communication; Industry K: Financial and insurance activities; Industry M: Professional, scientific and technical
activities; Industry N: Administrative and support service activities; Industry Q: Human health and social work
activities; Industry S: Other service activities
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in 2011 (11.3%) and 2013 (11.3%). The most frequently reported industry is industry 
C (representing 56.3% of the sample population), followed by industry G (14.7% of the 
sample population) and industry D (10.9% of the sample population). It is also worth 
noting that industry A, industry D, industry F, industry H, industry K, industry Q and 
industry S do not record any DIDS observations, implying that a DIDS structure is not 
popularly used by firms in these industries as a tax management strategy. Although all 
firms in industry E are associated with DIDS structure, this sample size is relevantly 
small. 
 
3.2 Dependent variables 
ETRs provide a convenient summary of the cumulative effect of various tax incentives 
and corporate tax rate changes (Gupta and Newberry, 1997). There are various ways 
to measure a firm’s effective tax rate. Stickney and McGee (1982) measure ETRs as a 
ratio of tax liability to book income. Gupta and Newberry (1997) use the ratio of 
worldwide tax payable to all tax authorities to total book income before tax. They 
argue that income taxes paid to different tax authorities often offset each other 
because of bilateral agreements. This approach is supported by Shevlin and Porter 
(1992), who point out that focusing only on the U.S. federal tax expense is misleading. 
 
In this study, three different approaches were employed to measure ETRs of sample 
firms as the dependent variables. Following the work of Gupta and Newberry (1997) 
and Richardson and Lanis (2007), the first ETRs measurement, ETR1, in Equation 1 is 
the GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) ETR which calculated as the 
firm’s total tax expense divided by pre-tax profit. The tax expense and pre-tax profit 
figures used are quoted directly from the financial statements. ETR1 is specified as: 
 
profittaxpre
ensetaxtotal
ETR


exp
1  (1) 
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The second measurement of ETR2 in Equation 2 is calculated as the cash tax paid 
divided by the pre-tax profit used by Dyreng et al. (2008) and Markle and Shackelford 
(2012). This measurement focuses on the actual tax expenses paid by firms. Dyreng et 
al. (2008) suggest that cash ETRs could overcome some limitations of GAAP ETRs. They 
argue that the total tax expense applied in GAAP ETR contains both current and 
deferred tax expenses. However, firms could actually achieve a lower tax expense by 
increasing deferred tax expense and reduce current tax payable, which cannot be 
captured by GAAP ETRs (i.e. ETR1). ETR2 is specified as: 
profittaxpre
paidtaxcashactual
ETR

2  (2) 
 
The third measurement of ETR3 is calculated as the current worldwide tax expense 
divided by operating cash flow. This alternative measurement is adopted by Gupta and 
Newberry (1997) who suggest that using operating cash flow can control the 
systematic differences in accounting method choices used by firms. ETR3 is specified 
as: 
flowcashoperating
ensetaxtotal
ETR
exp
3   (3) 
 
4.3 Explanatory variables 
Several explanatory variables were used because their importance has been 
established in the literature. These variables include a firm’s size (SIZE), which is 
measured as a logarithm of its market value in U.S. dollars. Firm leverage (LEV) is used 
to represent capital structure, and measured as long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Capital intensity (CINT) is measured as net property, plant and equipment divided by 
total assets. Inventory level (INVINT) is a subset of CINT measured by current assets 
less cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets. Research and development 
(RDNT) is used as a proxy measure of the capacity to generate intangible assets, 
measured by research and development expenditure divided by pre-tax profit. Cash 
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and equivalent (CASH) is measured by cash and cash equivalent divided by total asset, 
and is used to assess the liquidity level of the firm. ROA is used to capture the firm’s 
performance and is measured as pre-tax profit divided by total assets. The proportion 
of foreign income (MULT) is measured by foreign income divided by total income. The 
main variable is a specific DIDS dummy variable (DIDS) that measures whether a firm 
has a DIDS strategy to manage its tax. The DIDS dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm 
has both a Netherland and Irish subsidiary, and zero if it does not. Industry sector 
(INSEC) dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to that specific category and 
0 if it does not1. A calendar year dummy variable (YEAR) is also included. 
 
Table 2 describes the variables collected for sample firms. We also introduced several 
variables to measure the stateless income effect and DIDS strategy discussed in early 
stages. Dividend yield (DIVDNT) is used to capture firm’s dividend policy. As expected, 
firms involved in DIDS strategies are expected to have less cash on hold in U.S, which 
may lead to low dividend payouts. As a result, a negative relationship between 
dividend yield and DIDS is expected. Dividend yield (DIVDNT) is measured by dividend 
per share divided by price per share. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Industry codes follow NACE where Industry A: Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Industry B: Mining and 
quarrying; Industry C: Manufacturing; Industry D: Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; Industry E: 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; Industry F: Construction; Industry G: 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; Industry H: Transportation and storage; 
Industry I: Accommodation and food service activities; Industry J: Information and communication; Industry K: 
Financial and insurance activities; Industry M: Professional, scientific and technical activities; Industry N: 
Administrative and support service activities; Industry Q: Human health and social work activities; Industry S: 
Other service activities 
 22 
 
 
 Name Definition 
SIZE The logarithm of firm market value (in U.S. Dollars) 
LEV Total long-term debt / Total assets 
CINT Net property, plant and equipment / Total assets 
INVINT Current asset less cash and equivalent / Total assets 
CASH Cash and cash equivalent / Total assets 
RDNT Research and development expenditure/ Pre-tax profit 
ROA Pre-tax income / Total assets 
DIVDNT Current dividend / Current share price 
MULT Foreign income / total income 
DIDS DIDS dummy variable equals 1 if the company has both Netherland and Irish subsidiary and 
otherwise equals 0. 
INSEC Industry sector dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to that specific category or 0 
otherwise. 
YEAR Year dummy variable equals 1 if the firm financial year belongs to the specific year category or 0 
otherwise. 
Table 2 List of explanatory variables 
 
3.4 Regression model 
This study used a binary regression model to investigate whether firms with specific 
characteristics are more likely to adopt a DIDS structure (for example whether firms of 
a larger size or with higher leverage ratios or firms that have higher capacity to 
generate intangible assets are more likely to adopt a DIDS structure). The model is 
specified as: 
 
DIDSit = α0 + β1SIZEit +β2LEVit +β3CINTit +β4INVINTit +β5RDNTit + β6ROAit +β7Yearit + ε (4) 
 
Both pooled OLS and panel data approaches were used to analyse the data. Following 
the approach of Gupta and Newberry (1997), Richardson and Lanis (2007), Markel and 
Shackelford (2012) and Taylor and Richardson (2012), the following model was used 
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to examine the relationship between ETRs and a firm’s characteristics. Additionally, 
the study investigated whether a DIDS structure has a significant and negative impact 
on ETRs. 
 
ETRit = α0 + β1SIZEit +β2LEVit +β3CINTit +β4INVINTit +β5ROAit + β6RDNTit + β7CASHit + β8MULT  
(DIDS) it +β9YEARit +β10INSECit + ε (5) 
 
The literature suggests that firms adopting a DIDS structure generate stateless income 
through the investment and development of intangible properties (Kleinbard 2011). In 
addition, firms engaging in DIDS are associated with the ‘lock-out’ effect, which leads 
to large cash holdings (Foley et al. 2007). Thus, to formally test the impact of RDNT 
and CASH on ETRs through the DIDS structure, the variables DIDS*RDNT and 
DIDS*CASH were introduced into the analysis. These represent the DIDS dummy 
variable multiplied by the independent variables RDNT and CASH, respectively. The 
interaction terms were introduced to the basic regression model as follows: 
 
ETRit = α0 + β1SIZEit +β2LEVit +β3CINTit +β4INVINTit +β5ROAit +β6RDNTit +β7CASHit +β8DIDSit + 
β9DIDS*RDNTit +β10YEARit + β11INSECit + ε (6) 
 
ETRit = α0 + β1SIZEit +β2LEVit +β3CINTit +β4INVINTit +β5ROAit +β6RDNTit +β7CASHit +β8DIDSit + 
β9DIDS*CASHit +β10YEARit + β11INSECit + ε (7) 
 
We further employed two models to investigate the relationship between the DIDS 
structure, dividend decision, capital structure and a firm’s characteristics. We used the 
following empirical models: 
 
DIVDNTit = α0 + β1SIZEit +β2LEVit +β3INVINTit +β4CINT +β5ROAit + β6RDNTit + β7CASHit + β8DIDS 
(MULT) it +β9YEARit +β10INSECit + ε (8) 
 
LEVit = α0 + β1SIZEit +β2SIZE2it +β3SIZE3it +β4CINTit + β5INVINTit + β6RDNTit + β7CASHit +β8DIDSit 
+β9ROAit +β10YEARit +β11INSECit + ε (9) 
 
Where the dependent variables, ETRit, DIDSit, DIVDNTit, and LEVit are the ETRs, DIDS, 
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dividend yield and firm leverage for firm i in year t, i is the firms 1 through 392, t is the 
financial years 2004–2013. As discussed, three different approaches were employed 
to measure ETRs of the sample firms, therefore, ETR1, ETR2 and ETR3 were used as 
the dependent variables in models (5), (6) and (7) respectively. The independent 
variables include proxies for firm size (SIZE), capital structure (LEV), asset mix (INVINT, 
CASH, RDNT, CINT), firm performance (ROA), foreign expansion (MULT, DIDS), industry 
sectors (INSEC) and year (YEAR). 
 
A univariate test for the dependent and independent variables of firms with and 
without a DIDS structure was conducted once the ETRs were measured. The test 
determined whether firms engaging in a DIDS strategy have statistically lower ETRs 
than that of their domestic competitors and whether firms adopting a DIDS structure 
have any specific characteristics. Both the T-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test tested 
the difference in mean and median. Hypothesis testing was conducted on each of the 
explanatory variables to determine if that characteristic has a statistically significant 
impact on a firms ETRs and the direction and magnitude of this relationship. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (ETR1, ETR2 and 
ETR3) and independent variables (SIZE, LEV, CINT, INVINT, RDNT, CASH, ROA, MULT and 
DIDS). Panel A reports the summary statistics for the full sample, while panels B and C 
present the summary statistics for the non-DIDS firms and DIDS firms respectively. The 
results in panel A show that the dependent variables (ETR1, ETR2 and ETR3) have a 
mean (median) value of 0.283 (0.309), 0.219 (0.232) and 0.237 (0.244) respectively. 
DIDS has a mean value of 0.389 indicating that 38.9% of firms in the sample adopt 
DIDS structure. Panels B and C take a closer look into two sub-samples and it is 
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Table 3 Summary Descriptive Statics of ETRs and Selected Independent Variables
Pannel A: Full size range
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
ETR1 2837 0.283 0.309 0.099 0.000 0.449
ETR2 2681 0.219 0.232 0.116 0.000 0.450
ETR3 2546 0.237 0.244 0.116 0.000 0.450
SIZE 3192 16.047 15.911 1.209 12.040 20.254
LEV 3192 0.587 0.590 0.196 0.056 1.690
CINT 3192 0.285 0.211 0.215 0.001 0.933
INVINT 3192 0.269 0.258 0.144 0.011 0.823
RDNT 3192 0.028 0.007 0.051 0.000 0.757
CASH 3192 0.125 0.076 0.138 0.000 0.874
ROA 3192 0.097 0.093 0.096 -0.963 0.533
MULT 3192 0.324 0.319 0.278 0.000 1.000
DIDS 3192 0.389 0.000 0.488 0.000 1.000
DIVDNT 3192 0.014 0.006 0.020 0.000 0.277
Pannel B: Non-DIDS firms
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
ETR1 1745 0.297 0.326 0.102 0.000 0.449
ETR2 1624 0.219 0.236 0.123 0.000 0.449
ETR3 1513 0.241 0.250 0.120 0.000 0.449
SIZE 1950 15.739 15.695 1.052 12.040 19.303
LEV 1950 0.618 0.624 0.199 0.056 1.690
CINT 1950 0.344 0.285 0.232 0.001 0.933
INVINT 1950 0.261 0.245 0.152 0.011 0.823
RDNT 1950 0.019 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.757
CASH 1950 0.102 0.059 0.128 0.000 0.874
ROA 1950 0.092 0.085 0.095 -0.932 0.533
MULT 1950 0.230 0.111 0.276 0.000 1.000
DIDS 1950 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DIVDNT 1950 0.016 0.007 0.023 0.000 0.277
Panel C: DIDS firms
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
ETR1 1092 0.262 0.275 0.088 0.000 0.448
ETR2 1057 0.218 0.220 0.105 0.000 0.450
ETR3 1033 0.230 0.237 0.110 0.000 0.450
SIZE 1242 16.532 16.415 1.279 12.614 20.254
LEV 1242 0.540 0.539 0.183 0.109 1.110
CINT 1242 0.192 0.150 0.143 0.010 0.807
INVINT 1242 0.282 0.272 0.129 0.019 0.787
RDNT 1242 0.041 0.025 0.047 0.000 0.452
CASH 1242 0.161 0.112 0.146 0.001 0.809
ROA 1242 0.106 0.104 0.095 -0.963 0.532
MULT 1242 0.472 0.478 0.208 0.000 1.000
DIDS 1242 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
DIVDNT 1242 0.012 0.003 0.015 0.000 0.129
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observed that the DIDS firms have a lower average mean (median) value of ETRs 
indicating that firms adopting DIDS structure pay less taxes. The mean, median, 
standard deviation and range of independent variables are also presented in Table 2, 
suggesting that specific characteristics vary across firms with and without DIDS 
structure. The pairwise correlation results of key variables are reported in Panel D of 
Table 2. They reveal that LEV, RDNT, CASH and DIVDNT are negatively associated with 
all dependent variables ETR1, ETR2 and ETR3. In addition, ETR1 and ETR2 provide more 
consistent results in terms of correlation with independent variables as ETR3 is an 
alternative measurement using operating cash flow to assess the corporate tax 
burdens, and ETR 1 and 2 pay more attention to pre-tax book income. Furthermore, 
DIDS is highly correlated with MULT suggesting multi-collinearity. Therefore DIDS and 
MULT were tested separately in the models used in this study. Finally, a reasonable 
level of consistency between the means and medians for all variables is evident. 
 
Table 4 reports the univariate test for the dependent and independent variables of 
firms with and without a DIDS structure. ‘Difference Tests’ reports both t value for T-
test and z value for Wilcoxon rank-sum test of differences in mean and median. Panel 
A presents the univariate test for the main independent variables of firms with and 
without a DIDS structure. It indicates that firms with a DIDS structure have significantly 
larger sizes, a lower leverage ratio, a lower level of fixed assets, a higher level of 
inventory, a higher level of intellectual property, more cash in hand, a higher level of 
profitability, a higher proportion of foreign income and lower dividend yield, which is 
consistent with the hypotheses developed in this study. 
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Table 4 Univariate Test for Firm Characteristics and Different Industries
Panel A: t -statistcs of significance of independent variales 
Non-DIDS DIDS Difference Tests
Mean Median Mean Median T-value Z-value
SIZE 15.739 15.695 16.532 16.415 -19.082 *** -16.840 ***
LEV 0.618 0.624 0.540 0.539 11.132 *** 11.523 ***
CINT 0.344 0.285 0.192 0.150 20.629 *** 18.116 ***
INVINT 0.261 0.245 0.282 0.272 -3.912 *** -5.401 ***
RDNT 0.019 0.000 0.041 0.025 -12.075 *** -21.576 ***
CASH 0.102 0.059 0.161 0.112 -11.888 *** -15.284 ***
ROA 0.092 0.085 0.106 0.104 -3.968 *** -6.092 ***
MULT 0.230 0.111 0.472 0.478 -26.507 *** -25.692 ***
DIVDNT 0.016 0.007 0.012 0.003 5.957 *** 3.330 ***
Panel B: ETR1Non-DIDS DIDS Difference Tests
Mean Median Mean Median T-value Z-value
ALL 0.297 0.326 0.262 0.275 9.332 *** 13.849 ***
indB 0.311 0.331 0.336 0.323 -0.833 -0.091
indC 0.286 0.306 0.248 0.262 8.679 *** 10.241 ***
indG 0.350 0.368 0.334 0.345 2.409 ** 5.485 ***
indI 0.268 0.301 0.300 0.315 -1.253 -0.772
indJ 0.337 0.362 0.256 0.262 4.925 *** 5.826 ***
indM 0.143 0.089 0.258 0.266 -3.425 *** -2.200 **
indN 0.321 0.366 0.298 0.308 0.375 0.283
Panel C: ETR2Non-DIDS DIDS Difference Tests
Mean Median Mean Median T-value Z-value
ALL 0.219 0.236 0.218 0.220 0.141 1.125
indB 0.190 0.185 0.288 0.289 -2.607 *** -2.652 ***
indC 0.230 0.238 0.218 0.220 2.236 ** 2.578 ***
indG 0.301 0.323 0.265 0.291 3.364 *** 3.070 ***
indI 0.194 0.206 0.227 0.216 -1.210 -0.860
indJ 0.225 0.284 0.167 0.157 2.874 *** 2.572 ***
indM 0.074 0.002 0.217 0.220 -3.900 *** -3.414 ***
indN 0.087 0.079 0.126 0.135 -1.116 -1.225
Panel D: ETR3Non-DIDS DIDS Difference Tests
Mean Median Mean Median T-value Z-value
ALL 0.241 0.250 0.230 0.237 2.271 ** 2.751 ***
indB 0.211 0.203 0.307 0.335 -2.354 ** -2.278 **
indC 0.257 0.270 0.225 0.231 5.500 *** 5.656 ***
indG 0.305 0.316 0.289 0.318 1.214 0.699
indI 0.209 0.223 0.248 0.252 -1.435 -1.691 *
indJ 0.245 0.276 0.202 0.200 2.213 ** 2.621 ***
indM 0.112 0.000 0.249 0.268 -3.219 *** -2.875 ***
indN 0.133 0.137 0.052 0.055 2.156 ** 1.903 *
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
 29 
 
Panel B, C and D present the univariate tests for the dependent variables (ETR1, ETR2 
and ETR3) across different industries for firms with and without a DIDS structure. The 
results show that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
firms that adopt the DIDS structure and ETRs. As noted in Table 4, only industries B, C, 
G, I, J, M and N record both DIDS and non-DIDS observations in the sample, thus only 
these industries are contained in the difference test. ETRs vary significantly across 
industries mainly due to industrialized taxation policies. In industries C, G, J and N, 
DIDS firms have significantly lower tax rates than non-DIDS firms for all ETR1, ETR2 and 
ETR3. In contrast, firms adopting a DIDS structure in industry M have higher ETRs than 
non-DIDS firms. However, only 55 firm-year observations are available for industry M, 
representing 1.9% of the total sample data. As a result, there may be a small bias in 
the sample. 
 
4.2 Regression results 
Table 5 reports the regression results for Equation 4. As the dependent variable, DIDS, 
in this model is a binary variable, we used both Probit and Logit models to investigate 
whether a firm’s characteristics affect the likelihood that they will adopt a DIDS 
structure (Gujarati, 2004). Table 5 columns 1 and 2 report regression results of the 
Probit and Logit models for the total sample, respectively. While columns 3 to 8 report 
the regression results for industries C, G and J separately2. 
 
The results presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 are consistent with the findings of 
the univariate tests. For the total sample, SIZE is significantly and positively associated 
with DIDS, indicating that larger firms are more likely to adopt a DIDS structure and 
engage in stateless income strategies. LEV and CINT are significantly and negatively 
associated with DIDS, suggesting that DIDS firms tend to be less leveraged and have a 
                                                             
2 Among all industries, Industries A, D, E, F, H, K, Q and S contains either DIDS or non-
DIDS observations, then Industries B and M have no iteration achieved, Industries I 
and N do not have sufficient data in independent variables. 
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lower proportion of fixed assets. The results support the substitution hypothesis 
proposed by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). RDNT has a significant and positive 
relationship with DIDS, implying that firms that have a higher proportion of intellectual 
property are more likely to adopt DIDS structure. This result corresponds with the view 
of Kleinbard (2011) that DIDS firms could reduce their tax expenses by developing 
intellectual property. 
 
Columns 3 to 8 of Table 5 provide further insight into the difference between DIDS and 
non-DIDS firms in each individual industry. The results for industry C are similar to 
those for industry G and both are consistent with the total sample size. However, RDNT 
does not have a significant relationship with DIDS in industry C. In contrast, for industry 
J, RDNT is not only significantly and positively associated with DIDS but also has a 
remarkably large coefficient value. Industry J is the Information and Communication 
industry, which is traditionally called the high technology industry. Firms in industry J 
tend to be more innovative and control a relatively higher proportion of intellectual 
properties. Additionally, the significant relationship between RDNT and DIDS in 
column (1) and (2) is largely driven by firms from industry J. The findings suggest that 
the relationship between RDNT and DIDS varies across industries. Further, they 
confirm that the DIDS structure and stateless income is really a return on the 
development and ownership of intellectual property and is, therefore, only available 
for certain types of corporations (Davidson, 2011). Moreover, the findings challenge 
Kleinbard’s (2011) notion that a DIDS structure could be easily established and widely 
adopted by large multinational corporations through expenditure on research and 
development. 
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Table 6 reports the regression results for the Equation 5 variables of SIZE, LEV, CINT, 
INVINT, RDNT, CASH, ROA; industry and year effect are included in the equation as the 
significant relationship between these variables and ETRs has been well documented 
in the literature (Rego 2003; Richardson and Lanis 2007; Taylor and Richardson 2012). 
The results are presented in columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 6. Secondly, DIDS and 
MULT are added into the model to investigate their impact on ETRs; though, they 
cannot be included in one regression because of the high correlation between these 
two variables. The results are presented in columns (4) to (9) of Table 6. The adjusted 
R2 of all models is above 27% and relatively stable. 
 
The results show that there is no consistent relationship between a firm’s size and its 
ETRs. As observed, the size of a firm is negatively related to ETR1 and ETR3, but 
positively related to ETR2, thus hypothesis 4 is not supported. There are two possible 
explanations for the mixed findings. First, a DIDS structure is mostly adopted by large 
multinational corporations in the U.S. and the sample data set of this study includes 
the top 700 listed American firms. Therefore, the explanatory power of the size effect 
may be diminished in the sample selection. Second, ETR2 is a cash based measurement 
and the cash tax paid includes a mixture of current tax expense, actual and deferred 
tax expense which may introduce too much ‘noise’ into the sample. Thus, using cash 
tax paid as the ETR measurement may not reflect the real relationship between SIZE 
and ETRs. In addition, Davidson and Heaney (2012) point out that there exists a non-
linear relationship between a firm’s size and its ETRs. LEV is negatively related to all 
ETRs. LEV is significantly associated with ETR1 (p<0.001) and ETR3 (p<0.01). It supports 
hypothesis 5 that firms with a higher leverage ratio have more tax-deductible interest 
expense and, therefore, have lower ETRs, which is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies (see, for example, Rego 2003; Richardson and Lanis 2007). The results 
also show that CINT does not have a consistent relationship with ETRs. Therefore, 
hypothesis 6 that firms with a higher portion of fixed assets would have lower ETRs is 
not supported. This finding contrasts with previous studies (Gupta and Newberry 
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1997). The result also suggests that CINT is more closely related to operating cash flow, 
whereas ETR1 and ETR2 use pre-tax profit as the denominator for the measurement. 
As expected, INVINT has a significant positive relationship with ETRs. This supports 
hypothesis 7 that firms with more inventories tend to have higher ETRs. The reason is 
that holding inventory is not as much of a tax incentive as holding fixed assets. 
 
RDNT has a significant negative association with all ETRs, which strongly supports 
hypothesis 8 that RDNT is a proxy measurement for the investment and development 
of intangible assets, indicating that firms with a higher portion of intangible assets tend 
to have lower ETRs (Hassett and Newmark, 2008; Chen and Gupta, 2009). ROA has a 
significant positive relationship with all ETRs, supporting hypothesis 9 that firms with 
higher profits incur a higher corporate tax expense. In short, the empirical results that 
support hypotheses 7, 8 and 9 are consistent with prior research (Derashid and Zhang 
2003; Richardson and Lanis 2007; Chen and Gupta 2009; Taylor and Richardson 2012). 
 
The most notable contribution of these findings is that the key variable of interest, that 
is, the DIDS dummy variable, has a significant negative relationship with all ETRs. The 
findings support hypothesis 1 that firms adopting a DIDS structure and engaging in 
stateless income strategies do enjoy lower ETRs. This result also supports the claims 
made by Kleinbard (2011). The coefficient value of the variable DIDS in column 4 is -
0.022, which represents that firms adopting a DIDS structure and engaging in stateless 
income strategy have a lower GAAP ETR by 2.2 percent on average. Based on the 
sample data, the total taxable income for all firms with DIDS structure is $3,305 billion. 
Thus, these firms have successfully saved US $72.71 billion (72.71= 2.2% * 3305) in tax 
payments to taxation authorities around the world. MULT has a significant negative 
relationship  
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with all ETRs. The findings support hypothesis 2 that firms with a higher proportion of 
foreign income have lower ETRs, suggesting that these firms do have more 
opportunities to engage in tax avoidance activities. The findings are consistent with 
previous research (Rego, 2003; Dyreng et al., 2008; Richardson and Lanis, 2007). CASH 
has a significant and negative relationship with ETR1 (p<0.001), ETR2 (p<0.001) and 
ETR3 (p<0.001). This strongly supports hypothesis 3 that firms holding more cash and 
cash equivalent have lower ETRs, indicating that the ‘lock-out’ effect may be a main 
concern for firms applying stateless income strategies through their globalization 
platform. 
 
The results of panel data approaches are presented in Table 7. According to the 
Hausman Test, a random effect model is the preferred model and the results are fairly 
consistent with the pooled OLS analysis (see Table 6). SIZE has an insignificant 
relationship with ETR1 and ETR3 and a significant positive relationship with ETR2. 
Hence hypothesis 4 is not supported. LEV has a significant negative relationship with 
ETRs and supports hypothesis 5 that firms with lower leverage ratios have lower ETRs. 
CINT has an insignificant relationship with ETRs. Therefore, hypothesis 6 is not 
supported and on this basis it cannot be concluded that firms with a higher portion of 
fixed assets have lower ETRs. 
 
INVINT is positively associated with all ETRs, which is consistent with the findings in 
Table 6; however, the effect of INVINT is statistically insignificant, which may be 
attributed to differences between the methods of pooled OLS and panel data analysis 
(Gujarati 2004). Hence, hypothesis 7 is not supported and firms with higher inventory 
levels do not have higher ETRs. ROA has a significant positive relationship with ETRs, 
which supports hypothesis 9 that firms with higher profitability have higher ETRs. 
RDNT, CASH, DIDS and MULT have a significant negative relationship with ETRs, which 
is consistent with the findings of pooled OLS analysis presented in Table 6 and supports 
hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 8. 
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Table 8 presents the regression results for Equations 6 and 7 using the Pooled OLS 
model. The results of independent variables (SIZE, LEV, CINT and etc.) are consistent 
with the findings reported in Tables 6 and 7, supporting hypothesis 2 to 9. In addition, 
the coefficients of DIDS*RDNT are negatively and significantly related to ETR1 (p<0.05) 
and ETR3 (p<0.001) with only one exception in column 5. These findings show that 
firms with higher RDNT can more effectively reduce their ETRs via a DIDS structure. 
The results further confirm the argument that multinational firms exploit their 
intangible property to generate stateless income (Kleinbard 2011). DIDS*CASH also 
generates a significant negative relationship with all ETRs. The results show that firms 
with a DIDS structure can more effectively reduce their ETRs but they have to retain 
large amount of cash outside of the US territory, which can be explained by the ‘lock-
out’ effect. 
 
The empirical results of panel data approaches for Equations 6 and 7 are presented in 
Table 9. In general, DIDS, DIDS*RDNT and DIDS*CASH are negatively associated with 
all ETRs, which is consistent with the findings reported in Table 8. However, the overall 
explanatory power of these variables decreases dramatically. One possible explanation 
could be linked to the definition of the DIDS variable. Available data indicated whether 
the sample firm has an Irish or Netherland subsidiary but was limited as to when the 
subsidiary was established. Thus, the DIDS value of the sample firms is relatively stable 
during our sample period. 
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We were particularly interested in the impact of the DIDS structure and ‘lock-out’ 
effect. Thus, Equation 8 was developed to examine the relationship between a DIDS 
structure and a firms’ dividend payout. Table 10 reports the regression results for 
Equation 8. The results of the Pooled OLS approach are presented in columns (1), (2) 
and (3), while the results of the panel data approach are presented in columns (4), (5) 
and (6). 
 
Firms adopting a DIDS structure could generate stateless income, which would result 
in large amounts of cash on hand outside the U.S. territory. Therefore, these firms tend 
to have lower dividend payouts. However, the results presented in Table 10 do not 
indicate any statistically significant relationship between DIDS and DIVDNT. We could 
not confidently conclude that firms adopting a DIDS structure are paying lower 
dividends. Thus, hypothesis ten (H10) cannot be supported. One explanation would be 
that the DIDS as the dummy variable is relatively stable, which weakens its explanatory 
power. Therefore, we replaced the DIDS variable with MULT, the proportion of foreign 
income as the proxy of DIDS. Columns (3) and (6) show that MULT is negatively and 
significantly related to DVIDNT, which indicates that firms with a higher proportion of 
foreign income would have a lower dividend payout. A second explanation could be 
that historically low interest rates in the U.S. in recent years are having an impact on 
firms’ decision making. The low interest rate encourages firms to borrow from the U.S. 
market to pay dividends. The relationship between the location of the loan and a firms’ 
dividend payout requires further investigation. 
 
 41 
 
 
 
 
T
a
b
le
 1
0
 P
o
o
le
d
 O
L
S
 a
n
d
 P
a
n
n
e
l 
D
a
ta
 A
n
a
ly
s
is
 R
e
s
u
lt
s
 f
o
r 
D
IV
D
N
T
 
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
a
n
e
l
P
a
n
e
l
P
a
n
e
l
D
IV
D
N
T
D
IV
D
N
T
D
IV
D
N
T
D
IV
D
N
T
D
IV
D
N
T
D
IV
D
N
T
S
IZ
E
0
.0
0
2
2
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
4
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
5
6
8
0
.0
0
0
5
5
9
0
.0
0
0
8
9
5
(7
.2
0
)
(7
.1
5
)
(8
.2
6
)
(1
.1
8
)
(1
.1
6
)
(1
.9
0
)
L
E
V
0
.0
1
7
1
*
*
*
0
.0
1
7
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
5
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
6
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
7
*
*
*
(8
.8
7
)
(8
.9
0
)
(8
.4
2
)
(5
.5
1
)
(5
.5
4
)
(5
.1
9
)
IN
V
IN
T
-0
.0
0
6
6
6
*
-0
.0
0
6
6
2
*
-0
.0
0
4
7
3
-0
.0
0
5
2
2
-0
.0
0
5
3
5
-0
.0
0
3
5
3
(-
2
.1
4
)
(-
2
.1
2
)
(-
1
.5
0
)
(-
1
.1
2
)
(-
1
.1
4
)
(-
0
.7
5
)
C
IN
T
0
.0
0
5
8
5
*
0
.0
0
5
6
5
*
0
.0
0
5
4
6
*
0
.0
0
7
4
2
0
.0
0
6
8
8
0
.0
0
6
2
9
(2
.4
3
)
(2
.3
3
)
(2
.3
0
)
(1
.9
3
)
(1
.7
7
)
(1
.6
5
)
R
O
A
0
.0
0
7
7
1
0
.0
0
7
4
6
0
.0
0
8
0
2
*
0
.0
0
1
7
9
0
.0
0
1
3
9
0
.0
0
1
4
4
(1
.8
8
)
(1
.8
1
)
(1
.9
7
)
(0
.3
9
)
(0
.3
0
)
(0
.3
2
)
R
D
N
T
-0
.0
2
5
1
*
*
-0
.0
2
8
6
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
0
*
-0
.0
1
8
8
-0
.0
2
7
0
*
-0
.0
1
5
2
(-
2
.8
3
)
(-
2
.8
3
)
(-
2
.2
5
)
(-
1
.6
1
)
(-
1
.9
9
)
(-
1
.2
9
)
C
A
S
H
0
.0
0
1
1
2
0
.0
0
0
9
0
5
0
.0
0
1
9
7
0
.0
0
2
9
7
0
.0
0
2
5
1
0
.0
0
3
5
1
(0
.3
4
)
(0
.2
8
)
(0
.6
1
)
(0
.7
3
)
(0
.6
1
)
(0
.8
6
)
D
ID
S
-0
.0
0
0
1
8
3
-0
.0
0
0
5
3
7
0
.0
0
1
2
1
0
.0
0
0
2
2
2
(-
0
.2
4
)
(-
0
.5
9
)
(0
.8
5
)
(0
.1
4
)
D
ID
S
R
D
N
T
0
.0
1
0
7
0
.0
2
7
6
(0
.7
3
)
(1
.2
1
)
M
U
L
T
-0
.0
0
5
5
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
4
9
*
(-
3
.7
3
)
(-
2
.3
7
)
Y
e
a
r
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
In
d
u
s
tr
y
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
_
c
o
n
s
-0
.0
4
3
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
3
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
8
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
9
3
-0
.0
1
8
9
-0
.0
2
4
3
(-
5
.8
8
)
(-
5
.8
5
)
(-
6
.5
0
)
(-
1
.3
9
)
(-
1
.3
7
)
(-
1
.7
7
)
N
2
8
3
7
2
8
3
7
2
8
3
7
2
8
3
7
2
8
3
7
2
8
3
7
a
d
j.
 R
-s
q
0
.3
4
5
0
.3
4
5
0
.3
4
8
t 
s
ta
ti
s
ti
c
s
 i
n
 p
a
re
n
th
e
s
e
s
  
*
p
<
0
.0
5
 *
*
 p
<
0
.0
1
  
*
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
0
1
 42 
 
Table 11 reports the regression results for Equation 9 to further investigate the impact 
of a DIDS structure and stateless income on the capital structure of a firms. The results 
of the Pooled OLS model are presented in columns (1). They indicate that the adjusted 
R2 of the mode is 28.4%. The results of panel data approach are presented in columns 
(2). Following the approach of Davidson and Heaney (2012), we introduced a cubic 
relationship of firm SIZE and LEV. The results of Table 11 show that DIDS is negatively 
and significantly related to LEV for both pooled OLS and panel data approaches. The 
findings indicate that firms adopting a DIDS structure and generating stateless income 
are associated with a lower leverage ratio, which is consistent with the expectations 
on the relationship between DIDS structure and a firm’s capital structure. These 
findings also support the claim of Foley et al. (2007) that U.S. multinational 
corporations are more likely to retain cash in their foreign affiliates to avoid the implied 
tax consequence with repatriation. Thus, the larger amount of cash holdings leads to 
a lower leverage ratio. 
 
Table 11 Pooled OLS and Pannel Data Analysis Results for LEV 
(1) (2)
OLS Panel
LEV LEV
SIZE -1.899** -0.812
(-2.96) (-1.93)
SIZE^2 0.115** 0.0466
(2.92) (1.77)
SIZE^3 -0.00228** -0.000919
(-2.84) (-1.69)
CINT 0.110*** -0.0132
(4.71) (-0.41)
INVINT 0.320*** 0.209***
(10.66) (6.13)
RDNT -0.416*** 0.232**
(-4.84) (2.66)
CASH -0.202*** -0.162***
(-6.37) (-6.09)
DIDS -0.0547*** -0.0423*
(-7.39) (-2.12)
ROA -0.573*** -0.274***
(-14.81) (-10.33)
YEAR Yes Yes
Induestry Yes Yes
N 2837 2837
adj. R-sq 0.284
t statistics in parentheses  *p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001
 43 
 
Conclusion 
Stateless income has attracted the attention of the media in recent years. However, 
the literature on stateless income and its determinants is relatively thin. This research 
has empirically explored the relationship between stateless income strategies and a 
firm’s characteristics. It has also examined whether firms adopting stateless income 
strategies have lower ETRs, and investigated the impact of stateless income strategies 
on a firm’s dividend payout and capital structure policies. 
 
Using a sample of 2837 firm-year observations selected from top U.S. listed companies 
from 2004 to 2013, we found that larger firms with intangible assets are more likely to 
adopt DIDS structure. Thus, we argue that development and investment in intangible 
and intellectual property is an important component in developing a DIDS structure 
and generating stateless income. However, stateless income is not a universal tool for 
all companies across different industries, which is inconsistent with claims that 
stateless income can be widely implemented by all large multinational corporations 
(Kleinbard, 2011). The empirical results also show that firms adopting a DIDS structure 
tend to have lower ETRs, large cash holdings outside the U.S., and a lower leverage 
ratio compared to firms not engaging in a DIDS structure, which is consistent with the 
literature (Dyreng and Lindsey 2009; Faulkender and Petersen 2012; Taylor and 
Richardson 2012). Additionally, the results suggest that firms generating stateless 
income experience the ‘lock-out’ effect in relation to repatriation. 
 
We acknowledge that our study has several limitations. First, a majority of firms do not 
disclose the proportion of income earnt by Dutch and Netherland subsidiaries. Thus, 
while we could still adopt the DIDS dummy as the proxy, it would be difficult to 
measure the extent of its impact for stateless income. Second, while we could obtain 
data on whether the firm has Irish or Netherland subsidiaries, we could not detect at 
what time the firm first established its DIDS structure. 
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On October 14, 2014, the Irish government announced plans to stop its double 
resident tax policy, which would lead to the end of the DIDS and effect stateless 
income tax strategies. From January 1 2015, new companies may not pursue the 
‘Double Irish’ scheme and it can only operate until 2021 for existing companies. 
Further research could focus on how the end of the DIDS will affect the ETRs of 
multinational corporations’ and the emergence of alternative tax planning strategies. 
The U.K. and the Netherlands have announced the so called ‘knowledge development 
box’, which allows companies to separate out income stemming from intellectual 
property to which a much lower tax rate is applied. In addition, the Irish Finance 
Minister Michael Noonan mentioned that a comparable Irish regime “will be best in 
class and at a low competitive and sustainable tax rate”. Future research could 
consider the effect of intellectual property relocation and global tax competition. 
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